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David Braybrooke makes two criticisms of my theory of social power, 1 
one that deals with the time of power and one that concerns the relation 
between power and cost. In his first criticism he pointsout that, according 
to my analysis, Richard Nixon had the power, in 1940, to nominate Bur- 
ger for Chief Justice in 1970, and a certain twelve-year old boy may today 
have the power to hit the first home run of the 1990 season. ~ Braybrooke 
finds these consequences of the theory unacceptable. These agents may 
have the ability to acquire the indicated powers at these times, he argues, 
but they do not (yet) have these powers. 
To deal with these examples adequately, we must distinguish two uses 
of 'power'. First, we sometimes use the term to refer to a particular kind 
of resource, (legal) competence, or skill, as when we speak of the power 
of the veto, the power of attorney, or a hypnotic power. In this use, 
'power' frequently occurs as a count-noun, as in 'the powers of the Presi- 
dent'. Now in this sense of the term there is a legitimate distinction be- 
tween the possession of a power and the ability to acquire this power. A 
lawyer may have the ability to persuade a client to grant him the power 
of attorney; but the lawyer's persuasive ability is not the same as the 
power of attorney. Similarly, someone may have the ability to acquire 
the powers of the President, but this ability must not be identified with 
the powers of the President. In 1940 Richard Nixon may have had the 
ability to acquire the powers of the President some twenty-eight years 
later. But it does not follow that he had the powers of the President (in- 
cluding the power to nominate Supreme Court Justices) in 1940. I suspect 
that it is this sort of consideration that leads Braybrooke to deny that 
Richard Nixon had the power, in 1940, to nominate Burger for Chief 
Justice in 1970. 
There is another kind of construction in which 'power' appears, how- 
ever, which behaves somewhat differently. This second kind of construc- 
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tion does not identify any particular kind of resource or competence. It 
merely asserts that an agent has some resources (of unspecified kinds) that 
suffice for obtaining a certain outcome, or for affecting a certain issue. 
The time of  the power, in this kind of construction, may be different from 
(specifically, earlier than) the time of  the outcome or issue. The expression 
I employed in my paper - viz., 'S  has power, at t l ,  with respect to issue 
E at t, ' - is such a construction. Another, more familiar, construction of  
this sort is: 'It is in S's power, at t, to bring it about that e occurs at t " .  
For  example, 'It is in my power now to throw a party tomorrow night'. 
Now in this second use of 'power', it is not at all clear that there is a 
distinction between having power and having the ability to acquire it. On 
the contrary, I believe that constructions of this second sort exhibit what 
I shall call a 'de-nesting' property. When there are nested occurrences of 
the operator 'it is in S's power to bring it about that', one can preserve 
truth by deleting any internal occurrence of the operator. In other words, 
if it is in S's power at t to bring it about that it is in S's  power at t '  to 
bring it about that e occurs at t"  (where the temporal indicators are in 
serial order), then it is in S's power at t to bring it about that e occurs at 
t". For  example, if it is in my power right now to bring it about that it is 
in my power tomorrow afternoon to throw a party tomorrow night, then 
it is in my power right now to throw a party tomorrow night. It is this sort 
of  construction, bearing this de-nesting property, with which I was con- 
cerned in my paper. And in this use of 'power', it was in Richard Nixon's 
power, in 1940, to nominate Burger for Chief Justice in 1970. To be sure, 
nobody knew, or had reason to believe, in 1940, that this was in Richard 
Nixon's power. Even Richard Nixon did not know this. Nonetheless, it 
was in his power. 
Braybrooke contends that S has power, at t, over outcome e at t, only 
if  S has appropriate resources at t. Presumably, he thinks that whatever 
resources Nixon had in 1940 were not appropriate for nominating a Chief 
Justice in 1970. And whatever resources the twelve-year old boy has now 
are not appropriate for hitting a home run in 1990. But when are re- 
sources 'appropriate'? Does one have to have all the resources at t that 
will eventually be needed to obtain outcome e at tn? Certainly not. 
Suppose my stock of liquor and food is thoroughly depleted, but I have 
plenty of  money and ready access to liquor stores and supermarkets. I 
think my resources are sufficient that it would be correct to say that it is 
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n o w  in my power to throw a party tomorrow night. Clearly, I do not now 
have all the resources I will eventually need in order to throw a party. 
But as long as I have resources that suffice for obtaining other resources... 
that suffice for obtaining the outcome in question, then it is in my power 
no , ,  to bring about that outcome. I conclude, therefore, that it was in 
Nixon's power in 1940 to nominate Burger for Chief Justice in 1970. And 
it may be true that it is in the twelve-year old's power today to hit the first 
home run of the 1990 season. 
Braybrooke claims that the set of people who have power, according 
to my analysis, is much larger than the set of people that social scientists 
who study power are interested in. This shows, he thinks, that I cast my 
net of power too wide. But it is easy to explain, on my theory, why social 
scientists may not be interested in some people who hold power (over 
important political issues) at one time or other. First, it is not always easy 
to tell  who has power. A social scientist would not have shown much 
interest in Richard Nixon in 1940, for he would not have had evidence, 
in 1940, about the things that were in Richard Nixon's power at that time. 
Secondly, and more importantly, having power at one t ime over a given 
issue does not ensure having power at a later t ime over that same issue. 
In general, social scientists are interested in the people who have power 
over an issue at a time when the issue is being decided, or is about to be 
decided. There may be many people who once had power over this issue, 
but since they did not convert their resources into other relevant resources, 
or since they did not preserve their resources intact, they no longer have 
power at the time the issue is being decided. Such people will be of little 
or no interest to social scientists, despite the fact that they once had power. 
All this, of  course, is fully compatible with my account of  power. 
Braybrooke's second criticism concerns my claim that power is inversely 
related to opportunity cost. On my view, the more valuable the things one 
would have to  f o rego  in order to obtain outcome e, the less is one's power 
over e. Braybrooke's first remark on this point betrays serious confusion. 
He writes: "There can hardly be any temptation to accept this contention 
as generally true. If  S's total resources increase faster than the cost of 
getting e or not-e, the increase in cost hardly reduces S's power to obtain 
one or the other." 
The only way I can make sense of this remark is to construe resources 
and costs in terms of  money .  For example, if the cost of  obtaining e rises 
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from $1000 to $ 2000, but S's income meanwhile rises from $15000 to 
$ 20000, the higher cost of obtaining e does not reduce S's power over it. 
The trouble with this point is that my notion of cost requires measurement 
in utility, not money. In the case described, there is no increase in cost as 
measured in utility. In the second situation, as compared with the first, 
S would have more money left over after obtaining e. Hence, obtaining 
e in the second situation would involve fewer foregone opportunities, and 
hence less foregone utility, than in the first situation. It follows, on my 
account, that he has more power in the second situation than in the first, 
just as one would intuitively expect. Braybrooke might reply that his 
quoted passage refers to cost as measured in foregone utility, not to cost 
as measured by the money price of e. If so, however, I see no sense at all 
that can be attached to the supposition that resources increase faster than 
cost. If opportunity cost is increasing in any amount, it follows that (rele- 
vant) resources must be declining. 
Braybrooke not only disagrees with the idea that power is inversely 
related to cost, but thinks this betrays "a lack of due appreciation for 
commonplaces in economics". If Braybrooke were right about this, we 
should certainly be surprised if any competent economist would agree 
with the idea. But the idea that power and opportunity cost are inversely 
related was introduced into the (recent) literature by a well-known econo- 
mist, John C. Harsanyi, 3 as I indicated in my paper. Braybrooke's com- 
ment suggests that it is he who is ignorant of the work of economists on 
the topic of power. 
Nor is it recent writers only who have held a view of power that is 
similar, in the respect under discussion, to mine. Two classical philoso- 
phers, Plato and Hume, also espoused this conception, at least in embryo 
form. In his Treatise of  Human Nature, Hume writes: 
But according to common notions a man has no power, where very considerable 
motives lie betwixt him and the satisfaction of his desires, and determine him to 
forbear what he wishes to perform. I do not think I have fallen into my enemies power, 
when I see him pass me in the streets with a sword by his side, while I am unprovided 
of any weapon. I know that the fear of the civil magistrate is as strong a restraint as 
any of iron, and that I am in as perfect safety as if he were chain'd or imprison'd. But 
when a person acquires such an authority over me, that not only there is no external 
obstacle to his actions; but also that he may punish or reward me as he pleases, without 
any dread of punishment in his turn, I then attribute a full power to him, and consider 
myself as his subject or vassal. 4 
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PlwLo makes some similar observations in the Gorgias, employing an al- 
most identical example. That these two philosophers agree with me on this 
question does not show that we are right, but it strongly suggests that the 
thesis in question is not an 'aberration', as Braybrooke calls it. 
We should concede to Braybrooke, however, that there is a sense of 
'power' which ignores considerations of cost. A distinction may be drawn, 
then, between a cost and a non-cost sense of 'power ' .  These senses parallel 
the cost and non-cost senses of  'can' and 'able' that I discussed in Chap- 
ter 7 of my book A Theory of Human Action. 5 The first three sections of  
my paper on power were devoted, in effect, to the non-cost sense of 'power', 
though I did not formulate the matter in these terms. 
It must be granted that the cost sense of  'power' tends to be invoked 
only when fairly substantial costs are involved. It  is not surprising, there- 
fore, that we would not say that Nixon's power to choose Agnew as his 
running-mate in 1972 is not diminished by the fact that this choice would 
affect James Reston's endorsement. Here we stick to the non-cost sense 
of  'power'. But suppose that Agnew had been indicted, in the summer of  
1972, for (earlier) financial dealings in Maryland. Isn't it easy to imagine 
Nixon saying - privately, if not publicly - that he is 'powerless' to retain 
Agnew on the ticket? How could this remark be accounted for on the 
non-cost sense of  'power'? Admittedly, this statement would be a hyper- 
bole even on the cost sense of  'power'. For  if  we stick to utilities having 
finite values, no amount of cost can completely eliminate power. But some 
explanation of  this common hyperbole must be given. I f  the non-cost 
sense of  'power' (or of 'can' and 'able') were the only sense of  'power', it 
would be quite inexplicable how this sort of hyperbole should ever have 
obtained currency. My reconstruction of ordinary discourse is to suppose 
that cost affect degrees of  power, but that people allow themselves to talk 
of  'complete' powerlessness by way of exaggeration. 
For  further illustration of the cost sense of 'power' in the social and 
political arena, consider the degree of  power of a group of Blacks, who 
wish to influence legislation. There may be a set of sequences of action 
available to them that would secure their preferred outcome. But these 
actions may require unusual sacrifice, including great physical inconve- 
nience, harm to their persons, danger to their freedom and employment 
security, etc. Other groups may be in a position to influence comparable 
legislation with far less effort and sacrifice. Surely these factors are crucial 
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in the assessment of  the Blacks as having relatively little power vis-h-vis 
the issue in question. 
Braybrooke suggests that opportunity cost is relevant only to 'total '  
power, not to power with respect to a single outcome or issue. As long as 
S has the resources to obtain outcome e, his power over e is unaffected 
by the other events that would be foregone or incurred as a by-product 
of obtaining e. This, I believe, is a mistake. A person's power over a single 
outcome or issue is affected by the interconnection between obtaining this 
outcome and the occurrence of other events. 
The point is quite clear in Hume's example. The extent of my enemy's 
power over me is not simply a function of  his ability - in the non-cost 
sense of 'ability' - to do me physical harm. It is also a function of  his 
ability or inability to harm me with impunity. To the extent that he values 
his own life and liberty, his inability both to harm me and to avoid a 
sanction affects, i.e., reduces, his power over me. 
Another useful illustration concerns the relative power of a super-ordi- 
nate and a sub-ordinate. This example is borrowed from Harsanyi, who 
in turn credits it to Jacob Marschak (another prominent economistI). An 
employer has a secretary compile various reports, according to specific 
instructions. These reports are then used as the basis for an important 
decision. In the non-cost sense of 'power', the secretary has significant 
power over the decision, since omission or doctoring of pieces of informa- 
tion would affect the outcome substantially. Indeed, if we are restricted 
to the non-cost sense of 'power', the secretary may turn out to have more 
power than the employer with respect to this decision. But surely this is 
a misleading assessment of their relative power on this decision. The way 
to obtain a proper assessment of their relative power - one which rates 
the employer's power as greater than the secretary's - is to invoke the 
notion of cost. The secretary is in a position to affect the outcome only 
by doing things that endanger his or her continued employment. To the 
extent that the retention of that job is substantially valued, the cost of  
influencing the decision is substantial, and the secretary's power is cor- 
respondingly diminished. Note, however, that if it is the secretary's last 
day on the job, and if he or she has no need or interest in a good recom- 
mendation from the employer for future jobs, one's intuition suggests that 
the secretary's power is not insignificant on this issue. For  in this case, 
the prospective cost of affecting the decision is very little. 
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Braybrooke takes exception to my further contention that power is 
inversely related to the degree of desire that is needed to obtain the out- 
come in question. So let me comment on this contention as well. Bray- 
brooke is right in saying that, in the main, this contention is derivative 
from the contention about power and cost. The more costly an outcome, 
the more it would have to be desired before the agent would act so as to 
obLain it. It should be noted, however, that the introduction of degrees of 
desire is necessitated by the theory as a whole. The central theme of  the 
analysis is to account for power in terms of counterfactual suppositions 
about various agents' desires vis-a-vis the issue in question. It is assumed 
that such desires influence actions which in turn may influence the outcome 
of  the issue. Now the actions one performs are a function not merely of  
whether or not one wants a particular outcome, but of how much one wants 
it. Thus, if our counterfactuals are to have determinate truth-values, we 
must introduce degrees of desire. Once degrees of desire are introduced, it 
is natural to correlate them with power. 
There is independent support, however, for the correlation between 
power and degrees of desire. Consider the ease of a dictator or Oriental 
potentate whose every whim is satisfied. One of the reasons we count him 
as so powerful is that even his whims - that is, even the things he has ever 
so slight a desire for - are satisfied. When we compare his power with 
respect to a given issue with someone else's power over a comparable 
issue, we find that the potentate will get his preferred outcome even if his 
preference is very slight. By contrast, an ordinary person would get his 
preferred outcome only if he preferred it strongly enough to warrant the 
effort and difficulty of getting it. The contrast lies in the degree of effort 
and/or difficulty that the respective agents require. The potentate's power 
is so great that very little effort or difficulty is encountered, and this is 
rettected in the degree of desire that would suffice for satisfaction. 
Despite all of  these arguments, I must remind the reader that I am not 
completely satisfied with the account I have given of the relationship be- 
tween power and cost. Indeed, I expressed my reservations in the earlier 
paper at the end of my discussion of cost. I continue to believe, however, 
that only some reference to cost - along the general lines I have suggested 
- can account for the sorts of cases that I have adduced. 
The University of Michigan 
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